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Abstract
We experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public
good where individuals are allowed to update upwards their contribu-
tion during a fixed time interval. Experimental evidence shows that
the subjects are increasing their contributions in order to finance the
cost of the good. The public good is financed more frequently when
its cost is low relative to the social willingness to pay.
Keywords Public Goods, Experiments, Voluntary contributions, Dy-
namic contributions
JEL Classification: C92; H41
1 Introduction
Consider the following example of a real situation captured by our frame-
work. Ph.D. students in a research lab want to jointly buy a new work-
station. In order to buy it at a special tariff they must order it before the
end of the week. During the current week they can at any moment write a
check towards the purchase of the machine. The director of the lab collects
the checks and announces the total amount collected each time he receives a
check. A student that already wrote one or several checks can write another
one at any time. At the end of the week, if the sum of the checks covers
the cost, the workstation is bought. If the total amount is larger than the
cost the director can dispose at will of the extra amount (no refund of extra
contributions). If the total amount is less than the cost the checks are de-
stroyed (refund of contributions). In this paper we perform an experiment
for this situation.
Theory says that, in itself, dynamic structure of contribution to a public
good cannot lead to an efficient outcome, see Fersthman and Nitzan (1991),
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Admati and Perry (1991), Gradstein (1992). The reason for negative results
is that introducing dynamics allows individuals to free ride upon future con-
tributions. This can be counteracted by assuming some form of punishment
for free riders. For example, Marx and Matthews (2000) assume that the
individuals commit to stop contributing if some individual contributes 0 in
the current period. In our paper the punishment stems from the introduc-
tion of a fixed contribution period and a discrete public good. That is, there
is no benefit from contributing if a given total amount is not reached and
individuals cannot delay infinitely their contribution if they want to obtain
some positive gain.
With regard to the experimental analysis of the dynamic public goods
games the experiment in our paper presents similarities with the one in
Dorsey (1992). Dorsey is interested in the relationship between the produc-
tion technology of the public good and the amount collected, while we are
mainly concerned with the efficient provision of the discrete public good.
As in our paper, Dorsey allows the individuals to update their contribution
during a fixed period. He uses linear public good production technologies
which are continuous save for the following: if a given minimum amount
of total contributions is not reached, the good is not provided at all, but
the individuals are not refunded. There are two types of possible updates,
increase or decrease. All individuals are originally given the same amount
of (experimental) money—that is, they have identical WTP. By contrast,
in our paper, we allow only increasing updates. We have a binary produc-
tion function: either the good is produced in a given amount, or it’s not
produced at all. The individuals do not pay anything if the good is not
provided and individuals are originally given different amounts of (experi-
mental) money—that is, they have heterogeneous WTP.
Another related experimental paper is Levati and Neugebauer (2004).
The authors consider a situation where the contributions are increasing at
a fixed rate (English clock mechanism) and an individual can decide to stop
contributing (i.e. exit the game) at any moment, and never contribute again.
The decision to stop contributing is observed by the others. In contrast, in
our paper, an individual can increase his contribution freely, and can only
see the total amount collected but not each individual’s contribution. Fur-
thermore, Levati and Neugebauer assume identical WTP which are common
knowledge, and a linear production function. In contrast, we assume het-
erogeneous WTP which are private information, and a discrete public good.
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2 Experimental design
The experiments are conducted by groups of four subjects, n = 4. Two of
the subjects are endowed with 100 tokens (i.e. experimental money) and
the two others with 200 tokens, WTPi = {100, 200}. The endowments
are private information. As in Hichri (2004) we run two treatments with
different levels of social surplus. In the first treatment the cost of provision
of the public good, c, represents 60% of the sum of the individual WTP
(
∑4
i=1WTPi = 600), that is, the cost of provision is 360 tokens.
1 In the
second treatment the cost c represents 80% of the sum of the WTP, that is,
480 tokens.2 The time interval for contribution, T , is fixed to 90 seconds.
The experiment was run in January 2004 at LeeX (Laboratori d’Economia
Experimental), University Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. Each treatment in-
cluded two experimental sessions of about one hour and a quarter. In each
session we set three independent groups. This gives six independent statis-
tical observations per treatment and requires 24 subjects per treatment (48
for the whole experiment). All of them were students selected randomly on
the campus.
Each group played one practice period, followed by 20 paying periods.
At the end of each period each subject was informed about the number of
tokens he had earned. The number of subjects in a group, n, the provision
cost, c, the length of the time interval, T , and the number of experimental
periods was common knowledge. At the end of the session, a questionnaire
was distributed to subjects.
The experiment was computerised. We used as software z-Tree, devel-
oped by Fischbacher (1999). At the beginning of each session, subjects were
affected randomly to each computer. The experimenter read instructions
loudly3. Any questions were answered publicly. During the experiment
communication was forbidden.
Subjects were paid privately and in cash at the end of the experiment.
The payment of a player was equal to the amount of tokens he won converted
into euros according to the rate 100 tokens = 1 euro plus 6 euros as show
up fees.
1Note that in the first treatment equal cost sharing imply that every subject has to
pay 90 tokens, which is compatible with individual rationality.
2In the second treatment equal cost sharing imply that every subject has to pay 120
which is not compatible with the individual rationality of individuals with WTPi = 100.
3Instructions and a screenshot are available upon request.
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Figure 1: Contribution of each group over the 20 experimental periods (low
treatment)
Table 1: Efficiency ratio (low treatment)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Average
Ef 0.60 0.80 0.73 0.40 0.67 0.73 0.66
3 Results
We are primary interested on the ability of the mechanism to provide effi-
ciently the public good. A second question is: how do individuals behave
during the interval of 90 seconds; in particular do they increase their con-
tributions? To study the efficiency of the mechanism, we look on the total
amount of contributions after 90 seconds and we construct an index, de-
noted Ef , representing the ratio of the number of times a group succeeded
in contributing an amount sufficient for providing the public good (≥ c) over
the total number of playing periods.
3.1 Low threshold treatment (c = 360)
From Figure 1 we observe that in the first experimental periods some sub-
jects (groups 1, 2 and 4) contribute big amounts, bigger than their WTP for
instance. The reason is that they have not understood the game. Because
their payoff was negative, they quickly learned not to contribute more that
their WTP. Thus, we dropped out the first 5 periods from the analysis of the
results, considering them as learning periods. The ratio Ef was computed
over the 15 last periods.
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Figure 2: Individual contribution inside a period (low treatment)
We observe that the total amount of contributions is close to the cost of
provision, even if it is less than c in some periods or slightly larger than c in
other periods. When the amount exceeds the cost of provision, we find out
that this is because at the end of the period (in the last 3 seconds) several
individuals contribute simultaneously in order to complete the project. On
average the public good is financed 65.5% of the time.
Turning to individual behaviour, Figure 2 reports the average contribu-
tion of each individual inside a period, that is, after 15, 30, 45, 60, 75 and
90 seconds. This average is calculated over the 15 last periods. As it can
be seen from the figure, all subjects increase their contribution within the
time interval of 90 seconds. This behaviour suggests that they have incen-
tives to reach the cost of provision. Intuitively, the only way to obtain a
positive payoff is to contribute a total amount that is greater than c. Acting
in favour of this objective requires that subjects have to increase their indi-
vidual contribution. We could distinguish two main types of behaviour: (1)
individuals contributing large amount during the 15 first seconds and con-
tributing only slightly thereafter; (2) individuals contributing low amounts
during the first 75 seconds and contributing large amounts during the last
15 seconds. There are also individuals following a mixture of type 1 and
type 2 behaviours.
We also observe that subjects with low WTP (WTPi = 100; dashed
lines) contribute on average 69% of their WTP that compared to subjects
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Figure 3: Contribution of each group over the 20 experimental periods (high
treatment)
Table 2: Efficiency ratio (high treatment)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Average
Ef 0.07 0.20 0.47 0.27 0.40 0.07 0.25
with high WTP whose relative contribution is 52%. This could be explained
by a tendency to equal cost sharing observed in groups 5 and 6 (all members
contribute nearly 90 tokens regardless their WTP). In groups 2 and 3 this
tendency is mitigated by the behaviour of one individual with low WTP
who commit to low contributions.
3.2 High threshold treatment (c = 480)
As an alternative interpretation of the experiment, the time interval T can
be seen as a bargaining period in which a cost-sharing agreement might be
found. A benchmark agreement in such a bargaining situation is to share the
cost equally. As we saw in the previous section, there is a tendency towards
equal cost sharing in some groups. What will happen if equal cost sharing
is not compatible with the individual rationality of some individuals? The
aim of the second treatment is to give insights to this question.
The results can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 3. We observe that the
amount of contributions exceeds the cost of provision less frequently. On
average the public good is financed 24.7% of the time. In other words,
subjects have more difficulties to find a cost-sharing agreement. Intuitively,
the reason might be that the set of agreements compatible with individual
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Figure 4: Individual contribution inside a period (high treatment)
rationality is now restricted making it harder to reach an agreement. Indeed,
if the number of agreements that can be explored by a group during a given
time interval is fixed, determined by individual’s cognitive capacities for
instance, restricting the set of possible agreements automatically means that
the chances to find an agreement during a fixed time interval are decreased.
However, we still observe that the amount of contributions is close to the
cost of provision and that in some groups and periods individuals are able
to finance the public good. This means that the incentives to finance the
cost are still present. This can be recognised from Figure 4, where we can
see that subjects are increasing their contributions during the interval. We
also observe that subjects with low WTP (WTPi = 100; dashed lines) con-
tribute now on average almost the same relative amount than subjects with
high WTP, 72% and 71% respectively. This indicates that subjects have
understood that equal cost sharing is no possible, but eventually they had
no enough time to find a different cost-sharing agreement, leading to less
frequent provision of the public good4. Unfortunately, because of budgetary
constraints we were unable to test if increasing the contribution interval
would improve the efficiency of the mechanism. This is left for future re-
search.
4For comparison, we note that in Dorsey’s (1992) experiments the time interval was
fixed to 180 seconds, i.e. the double of the time given here.
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4 Conclusion
Experimental results have to be interpreted with great caution as they are
sensitive to the design of the protocol and provide a limited number of
independent observations such that general conclusions are not possible.
Nevertheless, the experimental evidence that we provide in this paper shows
that using a dynamic voluntary contribution mechanism to provide a discrete
public good would induce incentives for the individuals to increase their
contribution. This behaviour could be explained by the intuition that each
individual have an interest to act in favour of the objective of providing
the public good. In other words, we have a situation where when acting in
favour of his own interest an individual also acts in favour of the interest of
the society.
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